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Introduction 
The dramatic rise in crop prices that occurred in the fall of 2006 was the beginning of an 
unprecedented level of volatility in agricultural markets.  Corn prices for most of this decade 
have fluctuated within a range of US$0.50 per bushel around an average price in the low US$2 
range.  However, corn prices on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) doubled within a six week 
period beginning in September 2006 and then doubled again by the spring of 2008.  Corn prices 
then fell back to around US$4 per bushel.  Similar price spikes occurred in the wheat market.  
The recent rise of wheat and corn prices has revived memories of the commodity boom of 2006-
2008. 
The dramatic price changes evident in the commodity markets have consequences for 
both consumers and producers.  The sudden increase in major crop prices translated into higher 
food prices in developing countries and spawned concerns over the “silent tsunami” that was 
spreading over the less fortunate who could not afford adequate nutrition.  While the apparent 
higher average prices are a benefit to producers, the corresponding volatility has imposed greater 
demands on price risk management for farmers and grain handlers.  The two most important 
purposes of derivative markets are risk shifting and price discovery. However, the “unusual” 
commodity market volatility has created uncertainty around the accuracy of prices and in the 
potential loss of the major price shifting tool producers and the industry have – just when they 
need it most.  Higher volatility increases hedging costs associated with financing margin calls, 
and the increases have been large enough to force the closure of some small and midsized 
elevators. Other grain elevators are coping with the volatility and hedging costs by refusing to 
buy crops in advance from farmers, barring the most common way farmers lock in prices.  In an 
attempt to determine appropriate policies to deal with the consequences of the dramatic price 
swings to both consumers and producers, answers are being sought to the questions surrounding 
the causes for price movements in the agricultural commodity markets. 
A number of factors contributed to the rise in prices and the degree of volatility 
experienced in 2007-2008.  The stock-to-use ratio had fallen to historic lows for most crops as 
production levels had flattened over the years in response to continued low prices.  Poor harvests 
then occurred in some major exporting countries in 2006-2007 and this reduction in supply 
happened alongside several demand-side shifts.  The US dollar fell relative to other currencies 
increasing the purchasing power of foreign commodity buyers.  These buyers were increasingly 
from countries such as China and India which were experiencing GDP growth that was several 
times the global average.  In addition, renewable fuel mandates, particularly in the US, 
represented a new demand source that now accounts for over one-third of the US corn crop.   
Speculators were and continue to be a popular target for explaining the price swings 
experienced in the commodity markets.  The increase in the number of contracts traded mirrors 
the increase in price and is given by some as evidence that the activity has pushed prices above 
that implied by the underlying supply and demand fundamentals and increased the price 
volatility. It became common for political leaders and the media to argue that commodity index 
traders (CITs) and other large institutional investors exerted a destabilizing influence on prices, 
particularly after a submission by William Masters to a US Senate sub-committee in the summer 
of 2008.  Subsequently, there have been demands for regulatory intervention to lessen the 2 
 
impacts of speculative trading on the assumption that the actions of index traders destabilize 
commodity prices.   
The debate over the role of speculators on commodity prices was renewed in the summer 
of 2010.  An OECD report by Irwin and Sanders released early in the summer dismissed the 
impact of index fund investments on commodity markets.  While at the same time, other 
observers claim the doubling of wheat prices in July 2010 is partially due to the role of 
speculators and called for polices to dampen the volatility in agricultural markets.  
The purpose of this brief is to review the impacts of commodity index traders on prices in 
agricultural commodity futures markets.  Specifically, we aim to answer the following questions: 
1) how do commodity index traders operate; 2) what are the arguments of those claiming 
speculators have influenced commodity and in some cases food prices; 3) what are the counter-
arguments made by those who claim prices have moved due to underlying market fundamentals 
and not from speculator activity; and, 4) what are the implications of the presence of commodity 
index traders for the risk management and price discovery role of the futures market? 
 
The Role of Speculators 
 
The futures market is a commodity exchange where futures contracts for buying and selling 
commodities for future delivery are traded.  The futures exchange offers standardized contracts 
on set amounts of many commodities.  In the vast majority of cases, traders of agricultural 
commodity futures contracts do not take physical delivery of the commodity being traded on the 
futures market.  The primary purpose of the futures market is to establish prices for commodities 
for delivery at specified times in the future, and to enable commercial market participants to 
protect their business activities against the risk of future price fluctuations.  In the futures market, 
the three major types of traders are: 1) commercial traders or hedgers who use futures to reduce 
the risk of future unfavorable changes in the price of commodities that they handle; 2) non-
commercial traders or speculators who aim to benefit from future price movements; and, 3) 
arbitrageurs who attempt to profit by locking into more than one market.  
Speculators have been characterized by many as both ‘bad’ and ‘good’ when market 
prices are either too low or too high.  Markets are efficient if all available information is 
embedded into the price, which subsequently then follows a random walk.  In well-functioning 
capital markets, rational speculators enhance market efficiency. The literature identifies two 
types of speculators – rational traders and noise traders.  Rational or informed speculators base 
trading on market fundamentals and are likely to stabilize markets by reducing excess price 
fluctuations.  Noise or uninformed traders are investors who irrationally trade noise as if it were 
information pertinent to the value of the assets.  Noise traders can drive a wedge between market 
prices and fundamental values. According to this classification, speculative trading can be either 
stabilizing or destabilizing depending on which type of investors dominate the commodity 
market.  While the efficient market hypothesis assumes that all trades are informed so that 
market fundamentals determine commodity prices, the information content of trades only 




 Commodity Index Speculators 
  The traditional approach to investing in a commodity market was through the purchase of 
a contract on a futures market like the Chicago Board of Trade.  The volatility and margin call 
risks meant that such an investment was made primarily by hedgers or traditional speculators and 
not ordinary, risk-averse investors.  The development of financial instruments, particularly 
commodity index funds, created a vehicle for individuals and institutions to readily invest in 
these markets. A new category of trader, commodity index speculators (including pension and 
endowment funds), have been created and are now a significant part of futures markets. 
 
Commodity index traders (CITs) are institutional investors engaged in commodities 
futures trading strategies that seek to replicate one of the major commodities indices by 
mechanically following that index’s methodology.  Commodity indexes are derivatives that 
allow institutional investors to invest in a basket of commodities, where funds are not directly 
traded on futures exchange.  CITs consider commodity futures as an asset class, comparable to 
equities, bonds, real estate and emerging market assets.  CITs take positions on commodities as a 
group based on the risk-return properties of portfolios containing commodity futures relative to 
those confined to traditional asset classes.  CITs are passive traders who take on price risk, and 
are buyers (with a transparent buy and hold strategy). The participation by active (informed) 
traders and noise traders provides information about the future returns of an asset class, whereas 
the participation by passive investors should have no predictive power.  
 
As opposed to traditional speculators, index traders buy exposure to commodities in 
futures markets and maintain their position through pre-specified rolling strategies - buy and 
hold. Index funds provide a mechanism for the average investor to hold a position in the 
commodity market.  Commodity index traders seek exposure to commodities through passive 
long-term, long-only investment in commodity indexes.  Passively managed investments can be 
attractive to institutional investors with a longer-term investment horizon, such as pension funds.   
 
The amount of money invested in commodity index funds has risen from $13 billion at 
the end of 2003 to $260 billion in March 2008.  In terms of crop markets specifically, Masters 
noted that index speculators purchased over 2 billion bushels of corn contracts on the CBOT in a 
5 year period beginning in 2003.  Total investment in commodity index funds dropped slightly in 
2009 to approximately $240 billion due to lower commodity prices.  Although this amount is 
approximately 1% of the global value of pension and sovereign wealth funds, it is large relative 
to the size of commodity markets.  The next question is what impacts did this “new” money have 
on commodity markets? 
Index Funds Created a Price Bubble 
The correlation between the value invested by commodity index funds (CITs) and the increase in 
commodity futures prices is indisputable.  One group of CIT critics argues that the large inflow 
of funds into commodity markets by index investors caused prices to rise higher than justified by 
economic fundamentals.  These critics contend the new money became the driving force in the 
market and created a price bubble, as opposed to the traditional view in which commercial 
hedgers determine the volume of activity and speculators follow. 
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The concern over CITs was ignited in part to the submission by Michael Masters to the 
US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs in July 2008.  Masters 
noted that while traditional speculators have always been an integral part of the commodity 
futures market, index speculators are a relatively new component that entered after the stock 
market fall of 2002.  As Masters testified and as discussed in the previous section, index 
speculators buy futures and roll their positions forward by buying calendar spreads in contrast to 
traditional speculators who buy and sell future positions.  The “virtual hoarding” by CITs 
represented a new demand shock that decreased market liquidity rather than enhanced it as with 
traditional speculators.  As commodity prices rise, the subsequent allocation to a commodity 
futures index increases thereby accelerating the rate of price increase.  Thus, investors betting on 
high prices became a self-fulfilling prophesy according to Masters.   
 
Others suggested that the funds flowing into commodity markets through CITs and others 
represented not only a new demand but one that was too large relative to the size of the market.  
They claimed that the effect of taking a long position and continually rolling the hedge forward 
created a “synthetic” long position that was balanced against short positions held by commercial 
participants holding actual inventories of the commodity.  As a result, the “synthetic” buying 
pressure relative to the actual stocks of the commodity pushes up prices in the short-run. 
 
 
Index Funds Did Not Create a Price Bubble 
  The view that the new money flowing into commodity futures markets from CITs and 
other investors drove prices upward is countered by a group of economists who claim there is no 
causal link between commodity trading activity and futures prices.  The lack of a link is based on 
four counter arguments: 1) physical inventories are not held by index investors; 2) new money or 
new demand for contracts are met by new supply; 3) index funds will sell rather than increase 
investment levels during rising prices acting to stabilize futures prices; and 4) the trading by 
CITs is predictable rather than noise trading that could possibly influence price away from 
fundamentals. 
 
The first counter argument against the view that index funds fueled the price boom is that 
virtual hoarding does not exist.  Futures markets trade contracts for buying and selling 
commodities for future delivery and rarely involve dealing with actual physical goods.  In order 
to impact cash prices, the CITs must take delivery of the good after letting their long position 
contract expire and then hold these physical inventories off the market.  While the Hunt Brothers 
did so a generation ago in the silver market, there is no evidence that CITs have taken possession 
of commodities and thus affected the cash price through hoarding. 
 
A second argument is that the new demand for futures contracts by CITs can be met by a 
new supply of contracts.  Unlike the supply of the actual physical commodity, there is no limit 
on the number of futures contracts that can be created.  The futures market is a zero-sum game so 
for every long (or short position), a corresponding short (or long) position is established.   
Consequently, if the long positions of the CITs represent a new demand, the short positions of 
the same contracts represent the new supply.  This new supply does not require the inducement 5 
 
of a higher price.  Since futures markets are zero-sum games, the money inflows will not directly 
impact prices. 
 
Irwin, Sanders and Merrin suggest that the passive investment strategy by CITs stabilizes 
the market rather than creating bubbles.  Masters along with others argue that index funds will 
invest more in commodity markets as prices rise and thus the investment is a self-fulfilling 
prophesy.  In contrast, Irwin claims that CITs invest a certain percentage of their portfolio in 
commodities.  Higher prices will raise index values, and thus cause the CITs to sell some of their 
positions to reduce the percentage back to the desired allocation.  The selling during times of 
high prices thereby acts to reduce prices and stabilize the market.  
 
  A final argument revolves around the predictable nature of CIT trading.  As discussed 
earlier, trading must be unpredictable for any group to consistently push prices away from its 
market equilibrium.  Index funds follow the same passive investment strategy and do not attempt 
to hide their current positions or their next move, thus it is highly unlikely that other large traders 
would allow index funds to push future prices away from fundamental values for long when 




  Over the years, critics have argued that futures market prices have been either too low or 
too high.  Speculators have often been the target for the wrath of those feeling the futures price 
does not properly reflect market fundamentals.  Recently, the criticism has been vented toward a 
new type of speculator that has been blamed for the dramatic changes in agricultural commodity 
prices experienced over the last several years.  Commodity index traders (CITs) and other large 
institutional traders are commonly accused of exerting a destabilizing influence on commodity 
prices.  The intensity of the debate over the role of CITs appeared to wane with the reduction in 
commodity prices since 2008 but the recent release of a well-publicized OECD report on the 
issue by Irwin and Sanders along with the doubling of wheat prices along with claims that the 
rise was due to speculative activity has renewed the debate. 
 
The contrasting opinions still existing highlight the lack of credible consensus that has 
formed on the issue of causation between index fund investments in futures markets and 
commodity prices.  One side is the argument that the level of investment by CITs tracks the 
changes in prices.  The virtual hoarding generated by this activity has pushed up prices and that 
the revolving long positions held by these institutional investors puts constant upward pressure 
on prices.  The counter argument is that hoarding cannot occur with futures contracts as new 
supply is automatically created to meet any new demand.  This group of analysts claim that the 
passive and transparent investment strategy by CITs, without market power, should stabilize 
prices. It is highly unlikely that CITs would push futures prices away from fundamental values 
for long when their trades are so easily anticipated.   
 
While both sides agree that there is a correlation between CIT activity and commodity 
futures prices, the direct of causation is the point of contention.  The empirical evidence is mixed 
with very limited support for the view that higher commodity prices draws in investment activity 
                                                            
1 Weersink and Hailu contains a review of the empirical evidence from which these conclusions follow.  6 
 
by index funds.  However, a recent study by Gilbert appears to partially reconcile the two camps 
by suggesting commodity index funds are a means by which a common, albeit small, demand 
side shifter across all markets (i.e. GDP growth in China and India) can have a large effect across 
those markets.  There is more empirical support for the claim that CITs are associated with 
greater market volatility. Khara in a Brookings report argues it is unpredictable price volatility 
that is the real problem for producers, consumers and governments, not the level of prices.   
 
The controversy over the effect of CITs has prompted the regulator of futures markets, 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), to provide additional information on 
agricultural markets and to consider regulations on position limits, trading limits, and margins.  
If the CFTC decides to set new position limits for commodities of finite supply, this response 
may weaken the price discovery function of futures markets and this would not serve the public 
interest.  Imposing a rigid, inflexible position limit, solely on U.S. futures trading, could cause 
those traders who seek commodity price exposure to shift to OTC or to foreign exchanges.  If 
price discovery shifts to the OTC markets, it is more difficult for the CFTC to oversee. 
 
Despite the controversies around the influence of CITs, one can conclude that the rise in 
futures volatility will have implications on the hedging decisions of commercials. For example, 
if hedgers are concerned about mark-to-market risk and basis risk, they tend to hold a smaller 
futures position.  At the same time, higher volatility on spot commodity markets calls for a need 
for price risk management.  However, during the dramatic commodity futures price rise in the 
spring of 2009, the common price risk tool of forward contracting was not available to producers 
as some grain elevators refused to hedge a position associated with a guaranteed harvest price, to 
the farmer, in order to avoid the financial risks of large margin calls. Thus, an increase in 
commodity market volatility may lead to greater costs for managing risk: more costly insurance 
premiums, higher options premiums, and greater margins for hedging.  
 
The research conducted to-date suggests commodity index traders had little to do in 
driving prices upward but are one of the reasons for the significant increase in market volatility 
over the last several years, but are not the sole cause.  Demand growth associated with factors 
such as rising incomes in developing countries and increases in non-food uses like bioproducts, 
has resulted in edginess within agricultural markets.  Tight stock to use ratios mean any increase 
in demand or reduction in supply can send prices suddenly higher.  The most recent example is 
the July 2010 jump in wheat prices from the announcement of a decline in Russian supply.  
Volatile markets provide opportunities for arbitrageurs and speculative money will naturally 
flow into such a market.  Kharas argues that price volatility attracts speculators to markets and it 
is incorrect to suggest that speculators cause price volatility.  Restrictions on the level of such 
investment will reduce liquidity when markets are unstable and liquidity required.  Rather than 
regulate markets, governments should consider enhancing the risk management skills and 
opportunities for commercial producers. 
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